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Mary T. Noonan, Court Clerk
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Re:

E R CHRISTENSEN

A P R O F E S S I O N A L CORPORATION

p

E B 2 6 1993
Clerk of the Court

Kent L. Brown and Larry R. Hendricks. Plaintiffs and
Appellants v. Roy B. Moore; Elaine B. Weis; The Department of
Financial Institutions of Utah. Defendants and Appellees
Case No. 920703-CA (Third District Case No. C87-7906)

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Pursuant to Rule 25(j) Appellees hereby advise the Court
of supplemental authority entitled Prows v. State. 822 P.2d 764
(Utah 1991). Prows was cited in Appellant's Reply Brief for its
background facts regarding the thrift crisis in 1986. In Prows the
owners of Foothill Financial sued the Department of Financial
Institutions of the State of Utah after it took possession of
Foothill Financial.
Prows is the third relatively recent case
where the supreme court has upheld summary judgment or dismissal on
behalf of the Department of Financial Institutions in cases brought
by owners or shareholders of a failing thrift.
See Appellees'
Brief, pp. 17-2 0, where they cite the other two cases.
Although Prows can be distinguished from this case
because Prows contracted with the ILGC and not the Department of
Financial Institutions and the ILGC, the Prows decision does apply
to this case in at least three ways:
(1) Sophisticated purchasers are chargeable with notice
of statutes. Prows at 769. See Appellees' Brief at pp. 15, 16
where Appellees argue that Brown and Hendricks knew Western would
be regulated by the Department of Financial Institutions pursuant
to statutes. See also Facts 1 and 2 in Appellees' Brief showing
the sophistication of Brown and Hendricks.
(2) Duties imposed by law are insufficient consideration
to support a contract. Prows at 768. See Fact 7 in Appellees'
Brief at p. 9, stating that because Western was a "failing
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Mary T. Noonan, Court Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
February 26, 1993
Page 2
depository institution," as defined by the statute, the
Commissioner was empowered to require Western to enter an agreement
to transfer its control to Brown and Hendricks. Also, see pp. 1220 of Appellees' Brief where Appellees argue that the Department's
only obligation under the contract with Hendricks and Brown was a
statutory obligation to transfer stock.
(3) The appropriate place to resolve liability of the
ILGC was a proceeding liquidating the ILGC.
Prows, at 768.
Likewise, in Appellees' Brief at p. 20, 21, Appellees argue that
Brown and Hendricks must seek reimbursement for themselves out of
the proceeds from the liquidation of Western. In liquidation,
Brown and Hendricks are paid a residual after creditors are paid in
order of priority according to the law. Appellees' Brief at p. 23.
I enclose an original and seven copies of this letter to
be filed with the Utah Court of Appeals, and I have mailed, this
day, a copy to counsel for Appellants, Mr. John Mangum. I also
attach to this letter a copy of the Court's decision in Prows.
Truly,
CHRISTENSEN,

/dr
Enclosures
cc: John Mangum, Esq. (w/encls.)
Edward O. Ogilvie, Esq.(w/encls.)

EN & POWELL, P.C.
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Richard S. PROWS and Robert W. Wood,
individuals, and Foothill Federated
Corporation, a Utah corporation, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
The STATE of Utah, the Department of
Financial Institutions of the State of
Utah, and Industrial Loan Guaranty
Corporation, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 890161.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 5, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 1991.
Purchasers of industrial loan corporation brought action against the State, the
Department of Financial Institutions, and
the Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation
(ILGC) for breach of contract, statutory
entitlement and promissory estoppel for
failure to pay the full amount of guaranteed deposits. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, David S. Young, J.,
granted motion to dismiss. Purchasers appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J.,
held that: (1) an alter ego theory could not
be used to obtain a greater recovery from
the State than would have been available
under the statutes governing the ILGC; (2)
there was no consideration to support an
alleged contract under which the ILGC
would pay $15,000 per deposit account
where both parties merely performed statutory obligations; (3) the statute governing
the guaranty of depositors' funds limits the
liability of the ILGC to its available funds;
and (4) the purchasers' allegations did not
fall within any exception to the general
rule that estoppel could not be asserted
against the government.
Affirmed.
1. States <s=>208
Complaint filed by purchasers of industrial loan corporation adequately alleged
claim that State was alter ego of Industrial
Loan Guaranty Corporation (ILGC), even
though complaint did not include detailed

factual allegations; under notice pleads
requirements, complaint adequately alWed
that it would be inequitable to allow State
after dominating and controlling ILGC to
be protected from suit by being treated as
separate entity.^ U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-l to 78a-22; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 8.
2. States <s=>212
Even if State could be treated as alter
ego of Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation (ILGC), purchasers of industrial loan
corporation could not receive greater recovery from State than that available from
ILGC under breach of contract theory arising out of failure to guaranty deposits.
U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-8, 7-8a-13(l).
3. Consumer Credit <s=>4
Industrial loan corporation's payment
of statutory assessments to Industrial
Loan Guaranty Corporation (ILGC) could
not be "consideration" sufficient to support
alleged contract to guaranty deposits in
corporation up to $15,000 per depositor;
each party's act was undertaken pursuant
to statute. U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-8, 7-8a-13(l).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Consumer Credit <s=>4
Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation's (ILGC's) statutory obligation to guaranty deposits was subject to ratable reduction for whatever deficiency existed in
funds available to ILGC; ILGC's liability
was limited to its available funds.
U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-8, 7-8a-13(l).
5. Consumer Credit <3=*4
*/
Statutory limitation of Industrial Loan
Guaranty Corporation's (ILGC's) liability
for guaranty of depositors' funds was to be
resolved in proceedings for liquidation of
ILGC, not in court. U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-8, 78a-13(l).
6. Consumer Credit ®=>4
Claim under Industrial Loan Corporation Guaranty Act (ILCGA) provision guaranteeing depositors' funds should be made
directly against State, not against Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation (ILGC) as
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means of asserting alter ego claim against
State. U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-8.
7. Estoppel <3=*85
Elements of promissory estoppel are
promise that promisor reasonably expects
^rill induce reliance, reasonable reliance inducing action or forebearance by promisee
or third person, and detriment to promisee
o r third person.
8. Estoppel <3=*62.1
Generally, party may not assert estoppel against the government.
9. Estoppel <3=>62.2(2)
Claim by purchasers of industrial loan
corporation that Department of Financial
Institutions (DFI) and its commissioner
made representations that deposits would
be unconditionally insured up to $15,000
per depositor did not fall within exception
to general rule barring assertion of estoppel against the government; any statements made by DFI or commissioner directly contravened statutes limiting liability of Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation
(ILGC) to its available funds, and sophisticated purchasers were chargeable with
notice of statutes. U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-8/T8a-13(l).
Dennis K. Poole, Duane R. Smith, J.
Frederic Voros, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and appellants.
R. Paul Van Dam, Stephen J. Sorenson,
Bryce H. Pettey, Ray R. Christensen, Jay
E. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for the State of
Utah and the Dept of Financial Institutions.

("DFI") and the State of Utah (collectively
"the State").1 The amended complaint
sought recovery from the State for losses
plaintiffs suffered when Foothill Federated
Corporation was unable to continue operating as a financial institution. We affirm
the trial court's dismissal of the amended
complaint.
In its present form, the Industrial Loan
Corporation Guaranty Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 7-8a-l to -22, creates the Industrial
Loan Guaranty Corporation ("ILGC"), a
private nonprofit corporation intended to
guarantee thrift deposits until those deposits become federally insured. Utah Code
Ann. § 7-8a-2. Pursuant to that Act, all
industrial loan corporations which are not
insured by the federal government and
have outstanding thrift certificates of deposit or thrift savings accounts are members of the ILGC. Utah Code Ann. § 78a-6. Those members must participate in
the ILGC by paying assessments in
amounts the statute specifies. Utah Code
Ann. § 7-8a-10. The statute limits the
maximum amount of funds guaranteed per
depositor to 515,000. Utah Code Ann. § 78a-8.
Plaintiffs Prows and Wood, acting as
Foothill Federated Corporation, acquired
Foothill Thrift and Loan, a Utah industrial
loan corporation, on December 29, 1985,
after Elaine Weis, acting in her capacity as
the commissioner of financial institutions,
entered an order approving their application. Plaintiffs changed the name of the
institution to Foothill Financial and recapitalized it in the approximate amount of $5
million.

DURHAM, Justice:
Richard S. Prows, Robert W. Wood, and
Foothill Federated Corporation (collectively
"Foothill Federated" or "plaintiffs") appeal
from the trial court's order dismissing their
amended complaint as to defendants Utah
Department of Financial Institutions

The DFI granted plaintiffs a state charter when they acquired Foothill Financial.
The institution was not federally insured.
As a result, plaintiffs became statutorily
obligated to participate in the ILGC by
paying the required assessments. In July
of 1986, Weis and the DFI declared the
ILGC insolvent and, after declaring numerous Utah thrifts insolvent, seized those
thrifts' assets. On April 3 and 4, 1987,
Foothill Financial suffered a run on its

!• Foothill also named as a defendant the Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation. The claims

against the ILGC, however, were stayed by a
separate proceeding liquidating that entity.

P. Keith Nelson, David L. Barclay, Salt
Lake City, for Indus. Loan Guar.
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deposits, forcing it to close its doors. The
run was allegedly started by a television
news report that Foothill Financial deposits
were without any state or federal deposit
insurance.2
On April 4, 1987, Weis and the DFI
seized Foothill Financial.
Thereafter,
Zions First National Bank acquired the assets of Foothill Financial and Foothill Federated, conditioned on an agreement by
Prows and Wood (and other entities they
owned) to indemnify Zions against potennal
losses and refrain from participating in any
profits generated by the assets. At the
time of the transaction, Foothill Financial
deposits totalled approximately S27 million.
Due to the loss of Foothill Financial and
the indemnification granted to Zions,
Prows and Wood now claim that they sustained a loss of approximately $9 million.
Plaintiffs sued the ILGC, the DFI, and
the State of Utah for these losses, claiming
breach of contract, statutory entitlement,
and promissory estoppel.
Essentially,
plaintiffs argue that the ILGC promised to
guarantee Foothill Financial deposits, the
ILGC breached its promise by failing to
perform on the guaranties, the State was
the ILGC's alter ego (because of the relationship of Elaine Weis and the DFI with
the ILGC), and thus the State is answerable for the ILGC's breach. In addition,
plaintiffs seek to estop the State from denying representations and promises that
led plaintiffs to believe that the obligations
of the ILGC were guaranteed by the State.
The district court granted defendants'
motion to dismiss, citing the following
grounds: (1) defendants are immune from
suit under subsections 63-30-10(l)(a), (c),
(d), and (f) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act; (2) defendants have no duty of
care toward plaintiffs upon which tort liability could be predicated; (3) based upon
the allegations set forth in the amended
complaint, the State is not the alter ego of
the ILGC; and (4) defendants are immune
from suit under section 7-8a-20(3) of the
ILGC Act. Although none of these
2. Although Foothill had been conditionally approved for FDIC insurance, that insurance uas

grounds directly address plaintiffs' contract claims, we affirm the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint.
Three issues are before us on appeal:
first, whether the trial court properly ruled
as a matter of law that the State could not
be the alter ego of the ILGC, second,
whether it is clear that plaintiffs are not
entitled to relief on their breach of contract, statutory entitlement, and promissory estoppel claims, and third, whether the
State is immune from these claims under
the Governmental Immunity Act or under
section 7-8a-20(3) of the ILGC Act. Because of the nature of our resolution of
Dlamtiffs' alter ego, statutory entitlement,
oreach of contract, and promissory estoppel claims, we need not address the State's
governmental immunity defenses
I

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case comes to us as an appeal from
a dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) A motion to dismiss is appropriate only where it clearly appears that
the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or
under any state of facts they could prove
to support their claim. Colman v Utah
State Land Bd, 795 P 2d 622, 624 (Utah
1990) In determining whether the trial
court properly granted the motion, we
must accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those
facts m a light most fa\ orable to the plaintiff. St. Benedict's Dev Co v St Benedict's Hospital, 811 P2d 194 (Utah 1991)
II. ALTER EGO
Plaintiffs assert breach of contract, statutory entitlement, and promissory estoppel
claims in then- amended complaint. Recovery on the breach of contract and statutory
entitlement claims depends on a favorable
resolution of the alter ego claim. Under
the latter, plaintiffs assert that the ILGC
entered into a contract with Foothill Finannot yet in place
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part, "If the total funds available from the
guaranty corporation at that time are insufficient to pay in full the amounts provided by § 7-8a-8, the amount paid to each
account holder shall be ratably reduced in
proportion
to the amount by which the
n ] There are two requirements for
fund
is
deficient."
Plaintiffs allege in their
proof of alter ego. First, " 'there must be
amended
complaint
that they entered into a
such a unity of interest and ownership that
contract
with
the
ILGC
in which the ILGC
the separate personalities of the corporaagreed
"to
guarantee
Foothill's
deposits at
tion[s] . . . no longer exist*" Municipal
statutorily
mandated
levels."
(Emphasis
Bldg. Auth. of Iron County v. Lowder, 711
added.)
Because
the
terms
of
such
a conP.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1985) (quoting Nortract
would
necessarily
include
the
limitaman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co.,
596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979)). Second, tion of liability imposed by the statute,
the court's observance of the corporate plaintiffs cannot place themselves in a betform must " 'sanction a fraud, promote in- ter position by attempting to hold the
justice, or [cause] an inequitable re- State, as the ILGC's alter ego, liable under
the same contract.
Id.
sult. ..
- 1 and Foothill Financial's depositors, that
the contract was subsequently breached,
nd that because the State was the alter
Igo of the ILGC, the State and the ILGC
^e both liable for the breach.

The amended complaint alleges, "Although the ILGC was created by statute as
a private nonprofit corporation, by 1985 the
DFI and Elaine Weis . . . so dominated and
controlled the ILGC that it no longer had
any separate existence but had become the
alter ego of the State of Utah." The complaint also alleges that it would be inequitable to allow the State of Utah, after
dominating and controlling the ILGC, to be
protected from suit by considering the
State and the ILGC as separate entities.
The complaint does not include detailed factual allegations supporting plaintiffs' alter
ego theory, but under Utah's notice pleading requirements, the foregoing adequately
asserts a claim and puts the State on notice
of that claim. See generally Utah R.Civ.P.
8; Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663,
668-69 (Utah 1985).
[2] Plaintiffs apparently are relying on
an alter ego theory as a means of achieving
a greater recovery from the State than that
available from the ILGC. There is a fundamental flaw, however, in this reliance.
Even if we allow application of an alter ego
theory in this instance, and even if plaintiffs could prove this theory at trial, as the
alter ego of the ILGC, the State would be
liable only to the same extent that the
ILGC is liable. While section 7-8a-8 limits
liability to $15,000 for each depositor, section 7-8a-13(l) places a limit on the liability
of the ILGC. The latter section provides in

III. BREACH OF CONTRACT, STATUTORY ENTITLEMENT, AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIMS
In the order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint, the court found that (1) defendants
are immune from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 6S-3(M0(l)(a), (c), (d), and (f); (2) defendants owe no duty of care toward plaintiffs
upon which to base tort liability; (3) based
upon the allegations set forth in the amended complaint, defendants are not the alter
ego of the ILGC; and (4) defendants are
immune from suit under section 7-8a-20(3)
of the ILGC Act. We affirm the trial
court's conclusions, although on different
grounds than those articulated by that
court.
[3] The threshold issue we must address is whether plaintiffs have stated a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
The only contract claim alleged in the
amended complaint asserts,
''Plaintiff
Foothill Federated thus entered into a contract with the ILGC to pay statutorily
required assessments in exchange for the
ILGC's agreement to guarantee Foothill
Financial's deposits at statutorily mandated
levels." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the only
contract plaintiffs allege is a bilateral contract between Foothill Federated and the
ILGC. Plaintiffs did not bargain for a
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promise from the ILGC to guarantee deposits, however, nor did they pay the assessments in exchange for an act by the
ILGC. Neither party's act mduced the other's action. On the contrary, plaintiffs concede that each party's act was undertaken
pursuant to statute, based upon an existing
legal obligation.
It is well recognized that the performance of a duty imposed by law is insufficient consideration to support a contract.
See, eg, Hale v. Brewster, 81 NM 342,
467 P 2d 8,11 (1970) (court-appointed attorney had duty to accept payment from court
for representation as sole compensation; if
client's note was given to attorney as fee
for services attorney was already bound to
perform and client had a valid defense to
action by attorney on the note), Gragg v
James, 452 P 2d 579, 587 (Okla 1969) (oral
modification to contract relieving defendant of responsibility must be supported by
additional consideration to be enforceable),
Walden v Backus, 81 Nev 634, 408 P 2d
712, 714 (1965) (buyer's relinquishment of
premises insufficient to support accord
where buyer was already bound under sale
agreement to return premises), Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 73 (1981)
Therefore, we conclude that statutorily
mandated assessment payments do not constitute consideration sufficient to support a
contract Plaintiffs' breach of contract
claim fails as a matter of law.
[4] Plaintiffs' statutory entitlement
claim, which is also based on the alter ego
theory, likewise fails. The statutory entitlement claim is based on Utah Code Ann
§ 7-8a-8, which provides the amount of the
guaranty of depositors' funds. That statute, however, cannot be read separately
from section 7-8a-13(l), which requires a
ratable reduction of depositors' recoveries
by whatever deficiency there may be m the
funds available to the guaranty corporation. Because the legislature established
the liability of the ILGC under section 78a-8 and then limited its liability under
section 7-8a-13(l), plaintiffs cannot consistently assert a claim of statutory entitlement against the State based upon one
statute while ignoring the other. Whether

under the contract theory or the statutory
entitlement theory, plaintiffs cannot recovi
er more against the State as the alter ep
of the ILGC than they could by suing th
ILGC directly.
[5] By itself, the statutory limitation of
liability in section 7-8a-13(l) does not result m a dismissal of plaintiffs' claims
There may be factual issues regarding the
total funds available for the ILGC to digtribute The appropriate place to resolve
those issues, however, is m the separate
proceeding liquidating the ILGC Nonetheless, even if the statutory limitation of
liability is not a reason for dismissal, plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed
[6] Even if a statutory entitlement
claim exists against the State, an alter ego
theory cannot be a basis for that claim.
Section 7-8a-8, guaranteeing depositors'
funds, was enacted by the legislature A
claim based on that statute should be made
directly agamst the State Although the
ILGC may be a party to the action because
of its status as an entity created by statute
for the purpose of guaranteeing deposits,
there is no reason to use the ILGC as a
means of asserting an alter ego claim
against the State. Because there is no
valid contract claim and the statutory en*
titlement claim cannot rest on the alter ego
theory, it is unnecessary to determine
whether the State can be held liable as the
alter ego of a publicly created corporation.
Plaintiffs' third claim for relief is based
upon promissory estoppel. Plaintiffs seek
to estop the State from denying representations and promises that led plaintiffs to
believe that the obligations of the ILGC
were guaranteed by the State. This court
may uphold the trial court's dismissal of
this cause of action if the complaint fails to
allege the elements of a promissory estoppel claim or if, as a matter of law, estoppel
may not be asserted against the State in
this instance.
[7] The elements of promissory estoppel are (1) a promise the promisor reasonably expects will induce reliance, (2) reasonable reliance inducing action or fore"
bearance by the promisee or a third person,
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A (3) detriment to the promisee or a third
on See Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d
P
un 1103 (Utah 1987); Sugarhouse Fin.
JJ, i Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah
1080)' T^e a m e n ( ^ e ^ complaint alleges that
rn Weis and the DFI represented that the
State backed up the guarantees, (2) these
oresentations induced plaintiffs to acXe Foothill Financial, and (3) plaintiffs
L t approximately $9 million as a result.
That pleading sufficiently sets out the elements of promissory estoppel. We therefore turn to the issue of whether, as a
matter of law, plaintiffs are precluded from
asserting an estoppel claim against the
State.
[8] Utah recognizes the general rule
precluding a party from asserting estoppel
against the government. Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718
(Utah 1982). This rule safeguards the interests of the public which may be jeopardized by the 'Vagaries oi political tides,
frequent changes of public officials, the
possibility of collusion, or of circumventing
procedures set up by law, then suing for
the value of goods furnished or services
rendered." Id. Nonetheless, we recognize
an exception to this general rule in unusual
Circumstances "when it is plainly apparent
that its application would result in injustice, and there would be no substantial
adverse effect on public policy
" Id.
The critical inquiry is "whether it appears
that the facts may be found with such
certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is
of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Id at 720. In Sutro, we allowed an
estoppel claim against a government entity,
but stated:
In addressing the question whether under any state of facts that may be found
m this case the defense of estoppel may
P* applied, there are some observations
to be made. The first is that there is a
distinction to be drawn between contracts or activities which are either maj™* in se, or which are strictly prohibit** h statute, and thus may be strongly
gainst public policy, as compared to acuities . . . which, though not authorized
°y law, are not inherently evil In the
-former class of cases, it is quite univer**% held that no estoppel will lie

against the government, whereas in activities which are merely ultra vires the
courts are more likely to allow such a
defense
Id. at 719 (emphasis added).
[9] In this case, the individual plaintiffs
acquired Foothill Financial in a sophisticated multi-million dollar purchase. They
are chargeable with notice of the statutes
governing the ILGC, particularly section 78a-13(l), set out above, limiting the liability
of the ILGC to its available funds, and
section 7-8a-20(2), which provides:
All advertising by any person with regard to its membership in the guaranty
corporation shall include the following
statement: "Thrift certificates of deposit
and thrift savings accounts protected up
to a maximum of $15,000 by the Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation of Utah, a
private corporation which is not an instrumentality of the state of Utah or
the Federal Government"
(Emphasis added.) Any statements made
by Weis or the DFI that the deposits would
be unconditionally insured up to $15,000
are in direct contravention of these statutory limitations. Thus, plaintiffs do not
allege a claim that comes within the Sutro
exception to the rule that promissory estoppel may not be applied against the government. This claim fails as a result.
Plaintiffs do not allege any tortious conduct such as misrepresentation or negligence by Weis or the DFI. They do not
complain of any failure to warn Foothill
Federated of the imperiled financial condition of the ILGC or that the DFI failed to
discover or to be aware of the ILGC's
condition. Rather, plaintiffs rely solely on
an alleged contract with the State and/or
on the assertion that the State is estopped
from denying the existence of a contract.
These claims are without merit, and we
therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal
of the complaint.
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate CJ., and
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
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VIA HAND-DELIVERY

Kent L. Brown and Larry R. Hendricks, Plaintiffs/Appellants v. Roy B. Moore; Elaine B. Weis; and The Department
of Financial Institutions of Utah, Defendants/Appellees,
Case No. 920703-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Appellants Kent L. Brown ("Brown") and Larry R. Hendricks
("Hendricks"), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby
object and respond to the letter dated February 26, 1993 by
counsel for Appellees sent to the Court after oral argument (held
February 17, 1993), purportedly to advise of new supplemental
authority entitled Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991).
OBJECTION TO CONSIDERATION OF APPELLEES1 SUBMISSION
Brown and Hendricks object to consideration of the described
submission of Appellees on the following grounds:
1.
The Prows case cited in the letter is not a decision
which has only recently come to the attention of Appellees.
Appellees argued in the district court in this action that the
unpublished decision of the Third District Court in the Prows
case was authority to support the position of Appellees. R. at
267, 274.1
1

This was an improper argument at the time since it violated
Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration prohibiting
references to unpublished opinions with no precedential value, as
18749.HE624.1
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2.
Counsel for Appellees in this case were also counsel for
the State of Utah and the Department of Financial Institutions as
parties in the Prows case. Since the Prows opinion of the Utah
Supreme Court was released in early December of 1991, before the
briefing began in this appeal presently before the Court, the Prows
decision is not a matter which can properly be viewed as having
only recently come to the attention of Appellees or their counsel.
3.
The Prows opinion was cited in Appellants' Reply Brief
(at p. 12) for the limited purpose of providing background facts
regarding certain aspects of the history of the situation presented
here, only to rebut an unsupported assertion in Appellees' brief.
Appellees had full opportunity to refer to the Prows opinion at
oral argument, but chose not to do so. That decision does not
now entitle Appellees to argue the case in a subsequent written
submission to the Court.
4.
Appellees' complete and presumably intentional failure to
even mention the Prows opinion in their principal brief, shows that
Appellees' counsel recognized then that the Prows opinion has no
application to this case. Not only are the relevant facts in Prows
different and distinguishable from those in the present case, the
legal theories upon which the two cases have proceeded are entirely
different.
5.
To allow Appellees now to have the information in their
letter of February 26, 1993 considered by this Court subverts the
orderly process so carefully prescribed in the Rules of Appellate
Procedure and should not be countenanced.
SUBSTANTIVE REPLY
Should this Court decide to allow consideration of Appellees'
letter of February 26, 1993, notwithstanding the procedural
problems therewith described above, Appellants Brown and Hendricks
respond substantively as follows:
I.

Prows is Distinguishable on Both its Facts and Legal Theories.

As Appellees themselves partially acknowledge and concede in
paragraph 2 of their February 26, 1993 letter, the Prows case is

was then the case.
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readily distinguished from the case at bar.
In Prows., there
apparently was no written contract between the State Department of
Financial Institutions and Mr. Prows and Mr. Wood, the new owners
of Foothill Thrift.
In the present case, Appellants Brown and Hendricks entered
into formal written contracts with both the Department of Financial
Institutions ("DFI") and the Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation
("ILGC"). Both contracts were specifically reviewed and approved
by Defendant Weis as Commissioner of the DFI. Both contracts were
premised on a written pro forma projection of the anticipated
future performance of Western Heritage Thrift & Loan ("Western
Heritage") under its new owners. In the Prows opinion, there is
no reference to nor reliance on any such arrangement, which was
missing in that case.
In Prows, the Supreme Court held that the only contract there
alleged, one between Foothill and the ILGC, was not based on any
"bargain" made in that case, since the consideration from each
party was provided only pursuant to statute.
Prows, 822 P. 2d
at 767-768.
Further, the contract claim was not made by the
individual plaintiffs, but rather by plaintiff Foothill Federated,
which asserted that the ILGC was obligated only to guarantee
"statutorily mandated levels" of insurance coverage for deposits.
Id. By contrast, the contract claim of Brown and Hendricks does
not seek enforcement of statutory obligations, and is based on a
written agreement between them individually, on the one hand, and
the DFI, on the other.
In Prows, no constitutional or taking claim was alleged and
the Court was not asked to examine the circumstances of any
seizure which may have there occurred. Moreover, any such seizure
occurred, if at all, under circumstances quite different from
those of the present action.
II.

The Brown and Hendricks Contract was Based on Substantial
Consideration, Not Statutory in Nature.

Appellees, in suggesting in point (2) of their letter that the
Brown and Hendricks contract may suffer a statutory consideration
infirmity similar to the entirely different "contract" alleged in
Prows, improperly construe and attempt to misapply the Prows
holding.
In the case at bar, Brown and Hendricks specifically
bargained with the DFI to invest $550,000.00 of new capital and
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personal management services in return for a reasonable opportunity
to make Western Heritage sufficiently profitable so that they might
make back their investment and more. This consideration was not
statutory on either side. Brown and Hendricks were not obligated
by statute to contribute anything to Western Heritage.
Their
decision to do so was induced by the implied promise of the DFI,
inherent in the pro forma and written contract based thereon, to
allow them to manage Western Heritage for a reasonable period of
time.
While Utah statutes gave Commissioner Weis the power to
require the stock of Western Heritage to be transferred away
from its prior owners, which was done in 1984, that statutory power
was exercisable only because Western Heritage's prior owners had
allowed it to become a failing financial institution. This did
not depend on any conduct or consideration which originated with
Brown and Hendricks. The statute did not obligate Commissioner
Weis to transfer that stock to any new investor. She could and
presumably would have kept that stock for the DFI in December
1984 were it not for the new investment of capital, management
experience and effort which Brown and Hendricks brought to the
deal.
This was reflected in Commissioner Weis' requiring the
three-year future financial projections as a basis for the DFI's
willingness to transfer the stock to Brown and Hendricks.
Ill. The State's Taking Order Deprived Brown and Hendricks of any
Legal Basis for Compensation in Liquidation Proceedings.
The theoretical suggestion contained in point (3) of
Appellees' letter of February 26, 1993 is a new argument, raised
on appeal for the first time. It also ignores the fact that the
ex parte taking order depriving Brown and Hendricks of all of their
title to Western Heritage and its assets, leaves no legal basis for
Brown and Hendricks to claim, as former owners, any right to any
residual value which the liquidation proceedings might produce.
Moreover, that taking and divestiture precluded Brown and
Hendricks from any meaningful participation in the management of
the liquidation proceedings. This exclusion makes it less likely
for any excess recovery to be achieved by liquidators who are
less familiar with the thrift's assets. In addition, the State
consolidated the liquidation proceedings of many thrifts in such
a way that any excess produced by Western Heritage goes to pay
depositors of other thrifts, further lessening the likelihood
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that there could ever be any excess available for Brown and
Hendricks, even if they still had the right to seek such payment,
because the other thrifts being liquidated with Western Heritage
by the Appellees were much worse off financially than Western
Heritage, This transfer of "surplus" collections only could be
accomplished because of the taking of title to Western Heritage and
its assets from Brown and Hendricks.
Finally, the premise that underlies the unavailable remedy
suggested by Appellees is that good and profitable management
will be appropriately rewarded through a greater surplus while
inadequate management will be penalized by its inability to
generate a surplus. That premise supports the claims of Brown
and Hendricks.
Brown and Hendricks were recruited to step in and save a
dying institution just moments before it would have otherwise
taken its last breath, they provided new life blood for the thrift
in the form of new capital contributions, were providing the best
care and management possible for their patient, the thrift, and
were significantly ahead of schedule in strengthening it and making
it healthy when Appellees took Western Heritage. Appellees have
misdiagnosed the problem created by Appellees and their proposed
treatment is no cure.
An original plus seven copies hereof are respectfully
submitted this 4th day of March, 1993, and today I have sent a copy
to Mr. Denton M. Hatch, and Mr. Bryce H. Pettey, counsel for
Appellees, by first class mail.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
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Richard M. Hymas
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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Kent L. Brown
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